The World Bank's Ease of Doing Business index has significantly impacted regulations and policies regarding corporate matters around the world, and yet there has been scant academic attempt examining the use and implication of the Doing Business indicators, especially in the area of investor protection, an essential element in doing business. In this paper, we examine in depth the research methodologies employed by the Doing Business project in measuring the strength of investor protection, especially in light of the recent renaming of the index to Protecting Minority Investors index in Doing Business 2015. Using Singapore as a case study, we argue that, notwithstanding the positive changes brought in the latest round of changes, the variables and components chosen in the index essentially fail to capture salient features of minority protection. We argue that minority protection is an area which is inherently too context-specific to be evaluated based on a unified business assumption or by pure quantitative methods. Lastly, we also provide specific suggestions for improvements of the Protecting Minority Investors index.
that used to primarily measure the efficiency of a transaction or service to also cover aspects of the quality of that service, and to measure not only some aspects of the quality of regulation, but also recent good practices in the areas covered. 3 In particular, the name of the "protecting investors" indicator set has also been changed in 2015 to "protecting minority investors" to better reflect its scope, which has been expanded.
Although numerous academic papers have been published on the Doing Business topic and related policy issues, there is scant academic attempt examining the use and implication of the Doing Business indicators, especially in the area of investor protection, which is an essential element in doing business. 4 Thus, this article seeks to fill the literature gap by examining the newly revised Protecting Minority Investors index from a legal perspective and to discuss whether it captures the major areas of minority shareholder protection and accurately reflects the law and practice. In particular, this article will look at Singapore as a Classification and Rankings, (2012) (In this book, Davis et al. identifies legal, policy and normative implications of the production and use of indicators as a tool of global governance and assesses the strengths, problems and effects of indicators in Human Rights, Humanitarian Assistance, and Social Investment.) However, there is scant in-depth case study assessing the role of the Doing Business indicators in specific jurisdictions from a legal perspective. As claimed by the World Bank team, more than 100 academic papers have been published on the Doing Business topic and related policy issues (World Bank, Doing Business and Related Research, available case study in examining the newly revised Protecting Minority Investors index. Singapore is an excellent case study for this purpose as it has, for a very long time, enjoyed the distinction of being the world's easiest place for starting and doing business. As of June 2015, Singapore has retained its top position for the eighth year running on the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business index 5 . Also, the fact that the vast majority of listed companies in Singapore have a highly concentrated block shareholding structure 6 further highlights the importance of minority protection in the context of Singapore.
The remainder of this article will proceed as follows. Part II examines how Singapore uses the Doing Business indicators in guiding its business law reform and in maintaining and improving its top ranking on the Ease of Doing Business index. Part III critically evaluates the research methodologies employed by Doing Business and points out the limitations of the Protecting Minority Investors index. It also provides specific suggestions for improvements of the index. Part IV draws a conclusion and provides roadmaps for future reform.
II. HOW DOES SINGAPORE USE THE DOING BUSINESS INDICATORS
As observed by Davis et al, the use of indicators as a tool of global governance can be expected to affect decision-making by governing entities. 7 In fact, Doing Business has inspired more than 270 business regulatory reforms since 2003. 8 Policy-makers who are responsible for formulating rules and regulations of businesses have been particularly interested in Doing Business, as it helps them in identifying the best-performing jurisdiction or competitive jurisdictions on an individual indicator.
Singapore has been consistently ranked amongst the top for its efficient government and legal system, its high quality of the judiciary and the consistency of its application of law on 5 In the Doing Business 2007 Business , 2008 Business , 2009 Business , 2011 Business , 2012 Business , 2013 Business , 2014 Business and 2015 On the other hand, unlike other indicators which mainly measure the time and costs of starting and operating a business, the Protecting Minority Investors index does not make specific measurement of the time and costs of the procedures involved in a business transaction. It is, however, based on a hypothetical business assumption, which we argue fails to capture essential information of investor protection that it purports to capture. We elaborate on these areas in the following sections.
B.
Protecting Minority Investors Indicators: The Case of Singapore
The New Changes under Doing Business 2015
The Protecting Minority Investors indicators measure the strength of minority shareholder protection against directors' misuse of corporate assets for personal gain. Before 2015, the indicators comprised 3 dimensions: (1) transparency of related-party transactions (extent of disclosure index), (2) liability for self-dealing (extent of director liability index), and (3) shareholders' ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct (ease of shareholder suits index). 48 In Doing Business 2015, the scope of the indicator sets is significantly expanded. In particular, four key changes were made in Doing Business 2015: the introduction of the extent of shareholder rights index, the introduction of the strength of governance structure index, the introduction of the extent of corporate transparency index, and the addition of invoices, indicating low levels of transparency and poor internal governance in this foundation. In 2012, Kong Hee, a pastor of Singapore's biggest church, City Harvest Church, and five others were charged with misusing up to S$50 million of church money to fund the music career of Mr. the legal expenses component to the ease of shareholder suits index. 49 We will, in turn, discuss briefly these changes.
First, Doing Business 2015 expands the indicator in measuring the strength of minority shareholder protection by adding shareholder rights in corporate governance into its calculus. Specifically, the newly added "extent of shareholder rights" index considers the extent to which shareholders may have the power to influence important corporate decisions, including the appointment and removal of board members, the issuance of new shares and the amendment of the company's memorandum and articles of association. In essence, this index considers how much power is shared by the board to the shareholders (and hence, minority shareholders) in the decision-making process which affects the company.
Secondly, Doing Business 2015 also considers the governance safeguards protecting shareholders from undue board control and entrenchment in measuring the strength of minority shareholder protection. This so-called strength of governance structure index looks at the extent to which the law mandates separation between the different corporate organs, which is assumed to have the effect of minimizing the potential agency costs. The issues covered include whether the CEO can be the chairman of the board, the requirement relating to independent directors and whether there are rules relating to crossshareholding.
Thirdly, the revised index considers corporate transparency on ownership stakes, compensation, audits and financial prospects in measuring the strength of minority shareholder protection. The logic behind the addition of the strength of governance structure index is that transparency improves governance and lowers the cost of investment in capital markets. The improvement in governance as a result of greater transparency is therefore assumed to strengthen minority shareholder protection. Perhaps, the addition could also be explained on the basis that transparency leads to better informed minority shareholders and therefore strengthens the minority shareholder protection. The ranking on the strength of Protecting Minority Investors is based on the distance to frontier score. The distance to frontier score measures a country's performance on each indicator against the best practice.
50
In order to make the data comparable across jurisdictions, the World Bank researchers made several assumptions about the business transaction. 51 The Buyer is a publicly traded corporation listed on the Singapore Exchange. It is a manufacturing company and has its own distribution network. The Buyer has a board of directors and a chief executive officer ("CEO") who may legally act on behalf of the Buyer where permitted. Mr. James owns 60%
of the Buyer's shares and has elected 2 directors to the Buyer's 5-member board. Mr. James also owns 90% of the Seller, a company that operates a chain of retail hardware stores. The
Seller recently closed a large number of its stores. Mr. James proposes that the Buyer purchase the Seller's unused fleet of trucks to expand the Buyer's distribution of its food products, a proposal to which the Buyer agrees. The price is equal to 10% of the Buyer's assets and is higher than the market value. The proposed transaction is part of the company's ordinary course of business and is not outside the authority of the company. The
Buyer enters into the transaction after obtaining all the necessary approvals and making all required disclosure (i.e. the transaction is not fraudulent).
50 Beginning with Doing Business 2015, the ranking is based on the distance to frontier score rather than on the percentile. James is not allowed to vote (a score of 3). Mr. James is required to make full disclosure of all material facts pertaining to the transaction (a score of 2). The Buyer is required to disclose immediately all material information affecting the stock price to the board of directors, including the conflict of interest (a score of 2). In its annual report, the Buyer must also disclose the terms of the transaction and Mr. James' ownership in the Buyer and the Seller (a score of 2). Singapore Company Laws also require an external body to review the transaction (a score of 1). 55 There are seven components in this index. They are: (1) whether a shareholder plaintiff is able to hold Mr. James liable for the damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the company; (2) whether a shareholder plaintiff is able to hold the approving body (the CEO or the members of the board of directors) liable for the damage the transaction causes to the company; (3) whether a court can void the transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff; (4) whether Mr. James pays damages for the harm caused to the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (5) whether Mr. James repays profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff; (6) whether both fines and imprisonment can be applied against Mr. James; (7) whether shareholder plaintiffs are able to sue directly or derivatively for the damage the transaction causes to the company. 56 Id. 57 Pursuant to the changes made under the Companies (Amendment) Act, such derivative action can be made by the shareholder even though it is not unfair or prejudicial.
to minority shareholders (a score of 2). Mr. James has to pay damages for the harm caused to the company (a score of 1) and to repay profits made from the transaction upon a successful claim by the shareholder plaintiff (a score of 1). A court can void the transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder plaintiff when the transaction is negligently concluded (a score of 1). Fines and imprisonment can be applied against Mr. James (a score of 1). Adding all these scores in the seven components gives Singapore a score of 9 on the index.
The Ease of Shareholder Suits index measures the ability of shareholders to sue directly or derivatively.
58 Singapore scored 9.0 in this index, higher than the average score of 6.4 in the East Asia & Pacific region and the score of 7.2 for the OECD countries. 59 Under the assumptions made, shareholders owning 10% of the Buyer's shares can inspect transaction documents before filing suit (a score of 1). The plaintiff can obtain relevant documents 60 from the defendant and witnesses during trial (a score of 3). The plaintiff can request categories of documents from the defendant without identifying specific ones (a score of 1).
The plaintiff can directly question the defendant and witnesses during trial without prior approval (a score of 2). The level of proof required for civil suits is lower than that for criminal cases (a score of 1). Lastly, shareholder plaintiffs can recover their legal expenses from the company if they are successful (a score of 1). Adding all these scores in the 6 components gives Singapore a score of 9.0 on the index.
The accuracy of the scores reflected in this index deserves further discussion. Singapore was one of the first Commonwealth countries to introduce a statutory derivative action, indicating its commitment to be at the forefront of the Commonwealth in protecting the interests of minority shareholders. 61 However, the current Singapore Companies Act limits the availability of the statutory derivative action to unlisted companies only, though this will 58 Supra note 48. It assesses six components regarding the use of shareholder suits, including, among others, the range of documents available to the shareholder plaintiff from the defendant and witnesses during trial, whether shareholders owning 10% or less of the company's share capital have the right to inspect the transaction documents before filing suit, and whether the plaintiff can obtain categories of relevant documents from the defendant without identifying each document specifically. 59 Supra note 53. 60 These documents include: (1) information that the defendant has indicated that he intends to rely on for his defense; (2) information that directly proves specific facts in the plaintiff's claim; (3) any information that is relevant to the subject matter of the claim; and (4) including an order to restrain specific types of transactions or even to regulate the conduct of affairs of the company. However, in practice, courts exercise their jurisdiction in an oppression action to structure a remedy that puts to rest the matters giving rise to the differences between the controlling shareholders and the minority shareholders. In that sense, courts almost always confine themselves to two specific remedies: (1) a buyout of the shares of the minority shareholders either by the company or the controlling shareholders, or (2) a winding-up of the company. The essence of these remedies is to provide an exit opportunity to the minority shareholders so as to bring to an end the disagreements between the shareholders. 69 This is similar to the appraisal right available in jurisdictions such as Delaware, except that it is not available as a matter of right and must be ordered by the court upon demonstration of oppressive conduct by the controlling shareholders. 70 Since the principal outcome of an oppression action is to grant the minority shareholders an exit opportunity, the relevance of this remedy is largely confined to private companies or unlisted public companies. The utility of this remedy breaks down in the context of a public listed company as the minority shareholders do have an exit opportunity through the market that exists for the company's shares. 71 Nonetheless, in granting such a relief, the court can also grant other reliefs, for example, that the wrongdoer compensates the company for the damage it has suffered, which was what happened in Low Peng Boon v Janie Low. 72 In addition, the date against which the shares are to be valued can be tweaked to take into account the damage suffered by the company as a result of the wrongdoer's action. Also, a bigger problem for the shareholder is that it is very hard for him to prove where dominant members clearly prefer their own interests.
iii. General lack of depth with the existing Protecting Minority Investors index
In corporate law context, shareholders are the most common investors and there are basic governance rules that protect the interests of shareholders as a class, such as the appointment rights of shareholders, the independent directors, the decision rights, the reward strategy and affiliation rights. 86 There are also many important legal constraints that are widely used to protect the interests of minority shareholders -principally in the form of standards, such as the duty of loyalty, the oppression standard and abuse of majority voting. 87 However, the Protecting Minority Investors index has not measured these aspects in great detail and its coverage is merely brief, if not under-inclusive.
88
First, the power to select or remove directors or other managers -the appointment right -is at the core of corporate governance. 89 The appointment rights of shareholders are important for addressing the agency problems of (1) minority shareholders in relation to controlling shareholders; (2) shareholders in relation to managers; and (3) company employees in relation to the shareholder class as a whole. 90 Minority appointment rights are enhanced by either reserving board seats for minority shareholders or over-weighting minority votes in the election of directors. 91 By ensuring that minority shareholders are able to have one or more representatives on the board, the board would be prevented from becoming the expression of the controlling shareholders. 92 The minority shareholders would thus have access to centralized management: they would have access to more information about the company's business operation and would be able to influence the substantive decisions taken by the board. 93 In addition, there are many other legal devices which are used to dilute the appointment powers of large shareholders so as to protect the interests that an agent will not obtain personal gain from disserving her principal.
102
The trusteeship strategy involves placing the decision in the hands of persons not beholden to the majority shareholder. 103 As far as publicly traded companies are concerned, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Singapore usually have only one board of directors (one-tier board system). The board exercises the legal power to supervise and manage a corporation, either directly or through its committees. In contrast, in a two-tier board system, which is implemented in jurisdictions such as Germany and Austria, monitoring powers can be given to the supervisory board of non-executive directors, which then appoints and supervises management boards. Note the ineffectiveness of independent directors in Chinese listed companies due to the concentrated shareholding structure. 113 In Singapore, directors' duties of disclosure can be found in sections 156 & 165(1) of the Singapore Companies Act.
investors to assess the risks and rewards of their investment. It also provides the information necessary to protect minority shareholders through voting or litigation. 114 The disclosure regime for publicly traded companies includes two broad dimensions: (1) the disclosure obligations regarding securities issues and issuers, and (2) the informativeness of their disclosure requirements. 115 Disclosure generally comes in the form of prospectus disclosure, periodic financial disclosure and continuing disclosure. Besides publicly traded corporations, private companies and businesses are also subject to certain disclosure requirements such as the filling of annual returns, updating of business venues and updating of shareholding information. 116 Meanwhile, the provision of information about a firm's past and current financial position and its accompanying valuation methodologies, as well as the auditors that help to assist in assuring the quality of the disclosure, is essential in enhancing investor protection. 117 Also, "while there are stringent disclosure requirements that impose an obligation on the companies to notify shareholders of decisions to be taken at meetings, there is considerable scope for improvement in the quantity and quality of information disclosed to shareholders as well as in the enforcement of disclosure obligations (Tjio 2009)." 118 However, this is not measured by the index. In India, any such information disparity is corrected through intermediaries such as proxy advisory firms. Such a market for proxy advisory firms is nascent, if not non-existent, in the Singapore markets.
119
However, the Extent of Disclosure index does not measure the above areas, but merely measures whether the related party transaction is disclosed to the public and whether the director discloses the conflicts of interests in the related party transaction to the board.
Although mandatory disclosure of related party transactions is a vital legal strategy that guards against expropriation by managers or controlling shareholders and provides potential litigants with information to bring a suit before a court, 120 it is just one of the many disclosure obligations of a publicly traded corporation. Arguably, the score of a jurisdiction reflected in this index does not accurately represent the general level of transparency in a jurisdiction. 
As to the Extent of Shareholders Rights index, a dichotomy is drawn between companies
with dispersed shareholding that face the "vertical" agency problem between the managers and shareholders, and companies with concentrated shareholding with "horizontal" agency problems between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.
121
The current Doing Business indicators measure the general power of the shareholders as a body, in contrast to the powers exercised by the other organ (board of directors) However, in countries where there is concentrated shareholding, such as Singapore, "horizontal" agency problems are more relevant, and therefore it is arguably more useful to measure the power of the minority shareholders against that of the controlling shareholders. "It is paradoxical that in controlled companies any conferral of greater power to shareholders as a whole without differentiating the types of shareholders would considerably equip the controlling shareholders with greater power at the cost of the minority shareholders." 122 An example is the "disinterested shareholder vote" or "majority of the minority vote" that is required under the SGX's listing rules for "interested person transactions" involving listed companies. 
Suggestions
As has been shown in the earlier discussion, the Protecting Investors index seems unable to accurately reflect a jurisdiction's strength in investor protection and quality of corporate evolving area.
Moreover, as a jurisdiction's business environment is exceedingly complex, providing a summary of investor protection by using a simple variable can be highly misleading to users of the indicators, especially those without detailed information about the background of the jurisdiction. There are two ways to solve this problem.
First of all, Doing Business may consider excluding the Protecting Minority Investors index so as to make the report more accurate. In fact, what is good governance for one jurisdiction may not be good or effective for another, given the vast jurisdictional differences in legal system, political economy and regulatory architecture. As observed by French scholars Claude Ménard and Bertrand du Marais, the Doing Business reports do not cover the specificities of legal systems but only rank countries according to a set of superficial indices. 125 They do not measure the real impact of specific legal instruments but simply identify the market power in fixing the legal tools used in making business transactions.
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As observed by La Porta et al., "the nature of investor protection, and more generally of regulation of financial markets, is deeply rooted in the legal structure of each country and in the origin of its laws." 127 Empirical evidence also proves the links between the quality of legal regimes, the nature of national capital markets and corporate governance systems.
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In particular, the level of protection needed for investors is largely subject to local ownership structures. Thirdly, the Ease of Shareholder Suits index merely evaluates several procedural rights available to the shareholder plaintiff during trial, and does not look into other important elements in relation to the ease of shareholder suit before trial. It is suggested that the index should also cover pre-trial procedures (exhaustion of internal remedies), such as the extent to which the plaintiff shareholder may circumvent the board or directors, the supervisory board, or the body of shareholders to initiate the suit before trial; the circumstances under which a demand must be made to take action; and the consequences of a decision by the board or directors, the supervisory board, or the body of shareholders not to take action. In addition, considering the great impact of litigation costs (typically In the context of Singapore, the costs of litigation are prohibitive in nature; the "loser pays"
principle applies to limit risk-taking on the part of the plaintiff shareholders, and the plaintiff bar that is usually incentivized to bring class actions does not exist in Singapore as lawyers are prevented from charging contingency fees due to the prohibition against champerty. 
C. Beyond Rules
The foundation of Doing Business is the notion that rules matter. According to the project, economic activity, particularly private sector development, benefits from clear and coherent rules. 150 Where such rules are reasonably efficient in design, transparent and accessible to those for whom they are intended and can be implemented at a reasonable cost, they are much more effective in promoting growth and development. 151 The quality of the rules also has a crucial bearing on how societies distribute the benefits and bear the costs of 164 The World Justice Project is an independent, non-profit organization which develops communities of opportunity and equity by advancing the rule of law worldwide. 165 See World Justice Project, available at http://worldjusticeproject.org/factors/effective-regulatory-enforcement unreasonable delay; and (4) whether due process is respected in administrative proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
The case study of Singapore shows that the Doing Business project has informed and inspired various business regulatory reforms in Singapore. First of all, many important areas in achieving a trusted and conducive business environment are not addressed in Doing Business. In particular, several basic governance rules that protect the interests of investors, such as appointment rights and decision rights, are not systematically measured. Also, it is difficult for a single set of indicators to capture the full range of factors that would affect the quality of a business environment. Even for the chosen areas in the Doing Business project, it is challenging to evaluate how the law actually applies in practice. Typically, the essential areas in achieving a responsive business environment, such as investor protection and corporate governance, are too comprehensive and complicated to be evaluated based on a unified business assumption or by pure quantitative methods. Thus, a simple variable of investor protection would create an illusion for investors, as it treats some of the many pieces of information that are relevant for investor protection as an overall assessment of a country's level of investor protection. We thus suggest that the Doing Business project consider taking out the indicator of Protecting Minority Investors so as to make the evaluation of business regulatory environment more accurate.
Moreover, the Doing Business project measures mainly efficiency and we admit that the quantitative indicators help to reflect the level of efficiency in the selected areas of doing business. However, the type of regulatory reform that is needed or suitable in a business environment can vary substantially across jurisdictions. Meanwhile, the best or most efficient rules of doing business vary with the context for which they are to be used, as business performance is highly context-specific. It is subject to the specific nature of the business, legal infrastructure, corporate structure and economy of a country, and many other associated political-economic elements of a society. In particular, the level of protections required for investors is largely subject to the specific ownership structures in different capital markets. Therefore, improving economic efficacy in doing business is not necessarily an ideal solution for problems within a business environment, especially in dealing with corporate mismanagement and improving corporate ethics.
Lastly, the Doing Business report provides a cost-effective means for consumers of the indicators to understand where an economy stands in the aggregate rankings. However, these indicators should not be overused as a universal standard of quality for all aspects of a business environment. Policy-makers and business communities should exercise caution in attempting to draw inferences from a jurisdiction's ranking on the Doing Business indicators.
Policy-makers should also consider the peculiar needs of their business communities, in order to make the business regulations work feasibly in the specific context, and adapt their economy to the changing business climate and increasing globalization.
